Governance and banking system morphology in China: the evolution over the last two decades (1995-2015) by Bellavite Pellegrini, Carlo et al.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Governance and banking system
morphology in China: the evolution over
the last two decades (1995-2015)
Bellavite Pellegrini, Carlo and Pellegrini, Laura and Sergi,
Bruno




MPRA Paper No. 98571, posted 31 Mar 2021 11:31 UTC
 
Governance and banking system morphology in 
China: the evolution over the last two decades 
(1995–2015) 
 








Abstract: Over the past two decades in the Chinese banking system substantial 
progress has been made, and reforms have been mainly aimed at improving its 
governance and efficiency, but many governance problems still exist and 
hinder a complete transition to a market economy. Through the analysis of the 
economic freedom and the global governance indicators, in the context of a 
comparative analysis with European and North American countries, this paper 
shows that, despite a considerable economic growth, economic and financial 
reforms, Chinese governance variables are likely to have a second order effect 
in comparison with fundamental economic variables in favouring (or not) 
Chinese growth. However the high rate of growth, over the years of the 
financial turmoil as well, may have paradoxically prevented the improvement 
of governance indexes, meanwhile financial sector and global governance 
issues will have to be improved in order to promote efficient financial 
intermediation and sustainable growth in China. 
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Since its constitution in 1949, People’s Republic of China (PRC) was featured by a  
planned economic system without private enterprises. No relevant changes in this 
economic policy occurred until 1978, when the deep economic reforms promoted by 
Deng Xiao Ping readdressed Chinese economy toward a more market-oriented system, 
which fostered high growth rates of gross domestic product (Green, 2003; Yueh, 2003; 
Italian Trade Commission Beijing Office, 2005). This new approach reflected the need to 
reform the state-planned economy and to build up a legal system capable of supporting 
economic growth and “restore for the regime the monopoly on legitimate coercion that 
had been lost during the Cultural Revolution” (Potter, 2004; Lubman, 1999). These 
reforms concerned areas like as crime and public security, contracts, taxation and foreign 
business. Moreover, income tax and other programs were introduced in order to 
encourage small business economy (Dana, 1999). This path was pursued progressively in 
the aftermath of the fourth constitution of PRC dating back to 1982, when Chinese 
economy was firstly defined as a ‘socialist market economy’ featured by and increasing 
degree of liberalisation and of competition (Hughes, 2002; Nathan and Gilley, 2003; 
Nolan, 2004; Tan, 2005; Tenev, 2006; Shi and Dana, 2013). This period of transition, 
known by the literature as the time ‘from Mao to market’ (Gittings, 2006), boosted the 
birth of business activity promoted by private entrepreneurs and compelled Chinese 
Government to update its legislation and the overall institutional framework in order to 
foster the economic growth (Fan, 2003; Dana, 2002). 
In this way, a new powerful social class emerged. Particularly, managers of state-
owned and collective enterprises, with valuable political connections, represented the 
largest group from which private entrepreneurs emerged. In the meantime, as reform 
proceeded and business has grown, the business governance of Chinese private 
enterprises partially evolved towards modern forms of systems, although many 
enterprises have not yet separated ownership from control (Chen et al., 2006). 
Great steps forward had been implemented due to the program of reforms: China was 
successful in joining World Trade Organization in 2006 (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2003, 2005) and in March 2007 the Property Law was approved, allowing 
equal protection both to public and private sector and giving in this way ‘par chances’ to 
private entrepreneurs in developing economic activity (Atherton, 2008; Gov.cn, 2007a, 
2007b). 
Although the innovative legislation allowed private enterprises more operating 
freedom and flexibility than state-owned ones, the context of uncertainty over property 
rights and the risk of expropriation of the venture by the state partially still existed 
(Atherton, 2008; Lau et al., 1999), rendering, for some extent till nowadays, weak many 
governance issues, like the effectiveness of law enforcement (Lin, 1997; Potter, 2004; 
Peeremboom, 2002; Lubman, 1999), as we will describe in this article. China is still 
partially featured by a lack of contractual security and by ill-functioning information 
market (Krug and Hendrischke, 2002), factors which may generate ‘structural and 
institutional holes’ (Burt, 1992; Yang, 2004), affecting governance issues and economic 
development. 
Therefore, generally characterised by weak financial structures, limited legal 
protection for property rights and high institutional uncertainty (Shi and Dana, 2013; 
Dana, 1999, 2002; Yang and Li, 2008) China’s transition economy created however an 
environment in which entrepreneurship often develops in a different pattern form the 
more advanced economies (Shi and Dana, 2013; Ahlstorm and Bruton, 2002), 
highlighting partially “the enduring mistery of how China has managed to achieve 
impressive rates of economic growth over more than two decades (the eighties and the 
nineties) without an institutionalized system of property right” (Oi and Walder, 1999). 
Other economic literature investigates the issue of stability of the political and 
socioeconomic system to sustain growth (Chang, 2001), supporting the idea that 
“institutions play a rather different role in China   than   in   the   European   and 
North American experience”1 (Potter, 2004; Peeremboom, 2002; Lubman, 1999). 
Although recent literature documented the existence of a relevant link between 
 
corporate governance and firms’ performance around the world, as an important 
factor in improving value and growth [i.e., Gill et al. (2014) for Canadian framework; 
Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007] particularly in Asian and developing countries (Rouf, 2011; 
Jackling and Johl, 2009; Lusk et al., 2008; Saich and Jang, 2003), we document a lack in 
empirical studies focused on the relation between institutional governance at macro-level 
and growth of the single country. In relation with this evidence, we address our research 
to China in order to understand how did fit together the remarkable rate of economic 
growth and the evolution of institutional governance indices. 
Different measures may therefore be considered in order to evaluate the degree of 
governance quality around the world. In this study, we take into analysis Chinese 
governance indexes since 1995 and till 2015, utilising the devices of the index of 
economic freedom, measured by the Wall Street Journal and Heritage Foundation for 186 
economies in the world and by the Worldwide Governance Indicators, developed by the 
World Bank for 215 countries. We propose a comparative perspective   with 
Western Europe and North American countries. Each indicator respectively measures 
different aspects of governance on the economic and financial environment over which 
government is supposed to exercise typically a properly conceived control. Furthermore, 
we highlight some short institutional evidences about nature and morphology of the 
Chinese banking system, because we believe that such deepened on its peculiarity may 
contribute to foster the outstanding of Chinese economic growth. 
Despite the deep transformation of Chinese economy, countries governance indexes 
give evidence of a low level of transparency, disclosure, accuracy in accounting standards 
and of a not negligible level of corruption2, potentially jeopardising economic growth 
sustainability. Moreover, state-controlled companies are featured by poor corporate 
governance in terms of lack of transparency, weak internal control and protection for 
minority shareholders. 
Meanwhile, improved governance may be beneficial in the long run in fostering 
economic growth and in attracting foreign capital from abroad, the empirical evidence 
suggests that till nowadays governance indexes have been mainly second best ingredients 
in fostering the high rate of growth of Chinese economy (Boyreau-Debray, 2003; 
Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2004). This outcome is confirmed by existing literature 
devoted to East Asia (Arnone et al., 2006; OECD, 2003, 2005a), to European countries 
(Bellavite Pellegrini et al., 2011) and in more general terms to fast emerging markets 
(Bellavite Pellegrini et al., 2015; My and Truong, 2011). This paper is organised as 
follows: Section 2 provide institutional evidences on Chinese banking system; Sections 3 
and 4 highlight some evidences about the reason for which governance indexes have 
been assuming an increasing relevance in institutional and financial debate giving 
evidence of the work in progress in corporate and banking governance; Section 5 
overviews Chinese overall index of economic freedom evolution since 1995 to 2015, 
meanwhile Section 6 analyses the evolution of the above mentioned indexes, specifically 
related to China and specific regional area. A conclusive section provides further 




















2 Banking system morphology in China 
 
Like its economic system, the banking sector in China has undergone multi-faceted 
transformations since the Open Door policy in 1978, when Chinese Government 
introduced gradual reforms regarding both the banking system and its economy, in order 
to improve capital allocation, its profitability and transparency, and reduce government 
participation. Despite these reforms, China’s financial system is definitely a credit 
oriented system, dominated by banks that represent about 80% of the entire financial 
system, most of which are state-owned, with problems of NPLs and low capitalisation, 
where the government still plays a strong role in credit allocation and pricing of capital. 
Therefore, the banking system is still the primary channel of financial intermediation, and 
the role of other segments of the financial system is still limited. The main features of the 
different parts of the Chinese financial system are the following: 
1 The banking sector: It represents the first financial intermediation channel and its 
structure has been modified since 1978 (Deutsche Bank, 2004; Garcìa-Herrero and 
Santabarbara, 2004; Prasad, 2005). In particular, as regards banking reforms, the 
transformation process has begun since 1979 with the substitution of a single-bank 
financial system and the introduction of different banking institutions, a first step 
toward the modernisation of the Chinese financial system. Before 1979, the People’s 
Bank of China (PBC) was the only bank and, therefore, in charge of a large number 
of issues. As other centrally planned economies in China banks had a limited role in 
promoting economic growth. Nowadays the importance of capital markets is 
growing fast. In particular, there are four types of banks in China: 
a wholly state-owned banks (WSOBs) – who includes state-owned commercial 
banks3 (SOCBs) and policy banks4 
b commercial banks5 
c    credit cooperatives6 
d foreign banks7. 
Despite the reforms’ programs, ownership diversification, and improvement 
in profitability, the Chinese banking system still presents many problems: 
improvements in corporate governance, accounting standards and the regulatory 
framework are essential to bring China’s banking sector standards in line with 
international practises, in order to allow these institutions to price risk more 
accurately and introduce better risk management techniques, increase the efficiency 
and transparency of the system, ensure transparent and more efficient lending 
 
 
practices, prevent managers and insiders from using information for their benefits, 
and ensure equitable treatment for shareholders. 
2 Non-bank financial institutions: Despite their limited role in financial system, there 
are several types of non-bank financial institutions: 
• trust and investment companies8 (TICs) 
• insurance companies9 
• asset management companies10 (AMCs) 
• securities and leasing companies11. 
3 Stock and bond markets: in China, as in other emerging South-East Asian countries, 
the financial system is credit oriented, so stock and bond markets have a limited role. 
Economic theory however suggests that a more active role would be useful in 
promoting transparency, spreading information and improving intermediation, 
pricing of credit risk and corporate governance. 
 
 
3 Why do governance quality indexes matter? 
 
In the last decades, the topic of corporate governance has increased in importance: 
several recent studies highlight its main features (Tirole, 2006) and illustrate the 
importance of corporate governance to the company, its stakeholders and the wider 
business and finance community (Mallin, 2004; Rouf, 2011). Also, financial difficulties 
and corporate downturns over the years have shown that sound corporate governance is 
essential to promote stability and restore investors’ confidence, and a decreased 
governance standard affects issues regarding transparency, control and accountability 
(Barth et al., 2006). The concept of governance is broadly discussed among policy 
makers and in the academic debate since a long time (Kaufmann et al., 2005). Economic 
literature has explored the link between institutional change and economic performance 
(Mattei, 1997; North, 1990) and the role played by legal institutions in socioeconomic 
and political change (Jayasurya, 1999; Pistor and Wellons, 1999). 
Today’s successful economies are not necessarily geographically large or richly 
blessed with natural resource. Many economies have managed to expand opportunity for 
their citizens by enhancing their economic dynamism. In general, the overarching 
objectives of economic policies must be to create an environment that provides the most 
opportunity for the widest range of activities that can lead to increased prosperity. From 
this point of view, sustaining such economic dynamism is achievable only when 
governments adopt economic policies that empower individuals and firms with more 
choices, encouraging greater entrepreneurship. Growing economic freedom is 
unequivocally about more than financial success. Achieving greater overall prosperity 
that goes beyond materialistic and monetary dimension of well-being is equally 
important. In some countries, government policies and actions concerning the 
environment have become more intrusive and economically distortionary. Such policies 
impose a huge direct cost on society, and they also retard economic growth – and all for 
uncertain environmental benefits. 
In particular, Levine (2004), dealing with banking governance, shows that weak 
governance has a negative impact on the economy, especially for economic development. 
In addition, given the greater opaqueness of banks than other firms and their greater 
 
 
government regulation, this paper underlines the importance of strengthening the ability 
for private investors to introduce improved governance practices over banks than relying 
excessively on government regulators. In the Chinese banking system, the primary 
channel of financial intermediation, substantial progress has been made, and reforms 
have been mainly aimed at improving its governance and efficiency, but many 
governance problems in the financial sector still exist: the banking system is still mostly 
state-owned with problems of non-performing loans (NPLs), limited bank capitalisation 
and inefficient resources allocation. However, financial sector and global governance 
issues will have to be improved in order to promote efficient financial intermediation and 
resources allocation, ensure macroeconomic stability, and sustainable growth. 
Several authors have given a valid contribution to this subject (Garcìa-Herrero and 
Santabarbara, 2004; Garcìa-Herrero et al., 2005), showing that banking in China 
represents a fragile component of its economy with its poor lending policies that have 
favoured the rise of NPLs. After describing the banking market and identifying 
challenges facing the banking industry and recent policy responses (such as the measures 
introduced by the banking supervisory authorities), these studies underline that Chinese 
banking sector has the potential to stimulate sustainable growth. 
 
 
4 Corporate and banking governance: work in progress 
 
Over the years, China has made significant progress in developing corporate and banking 
governance, and in defining the role of the state: different banks and enterprises have 
modified their ownership structure, also through the public listing, favouring the entry of 
foreign capital and private investors and decreasing political interference. Moreover, new 
regulatory bodies, independent directors system and corporate governance codes have 
been introduced. However, real and financial sector restructuring has been quite slow, 
despite the reforms’ programs. For emerging countries such as China, improving their 
economic system and strengthening their institutions are essential requirements, if they 
want to promote long-term growth that allows them to face challenges and shocks. In 
particular, the Chinese banking sector still presents many limits: the solvency of Chinese 
banks is still weak and their profitability is poor; moreover, because of the political 
influence, there are high levels of NPLs and assets quality is low. Management systems 
are often inefficient and lack adequate management skills; despite the establishment of 
new regulatory bodies and the introduction of corporate governance codes, internal 
controls are still weak and problems regarding an unclear division of responsibilities 
among supervisory bodies still exist. Dominant banking institutions remain four large 
state-owned banks, with problems of NPLs, lack of transparency, corruption and other 
abuses. Therefore, China’s transition to a market economy is incomplete. The state 
continues to maintain a dominant role in banking sector and in the companies ownership. 
There are also problems of inefficient capital allocation and NPLs for banks, as well as 
poor governance, weak internal controls, and lack of adequate risk management systems. 
For Chinese SOCBs and commercial banks as a whole, the objectives of the reforms 
aim to raise asset quality and solvency, and favour their transformation in more 
financially sound and independent commercial institutions. For instance, it is essential to 
redefine the role of the state, eliminate or decrease the negative impact of dominant state 
ownership on market discipline and improve state role as supervisor and regulator. 
 
 
Ownership diversification is important in order to decrease conflicts of interest where 
local governments influence lending decisions when they are both the owner and 
regulator (World Bank, 1997, 2006). Privatisation can be a solution, in order to decrease 
NPLs and favour a more commercially-oriented lending activity of these banks. 
Furthermore, the entry of foreign capital is useful to stimulate competition and improve 
quality of services: foreign ownership can promote the transfer of technical knowledge, 
the introduction of more efficient risk assessment and management systems, new and 
innovative skills, better corporate governance, and the improvement of the quality of the 
human resources. Another important step concerns the strengthening of the role of the 
Board of Directors (OECD, 2003), particularly regarding the appointment of the top 
management of a bank. The relevance of the role and of the composition of the board of 
director has been clearly emphasised by many corporate governance studies: the 
independent directors’ role is important to promote more transparency. Specifically, large 
banks should have an internal credit-risk rating system based on Basel II, while smaller 
banks should try to apply elements of best practices for managing credit risk by collecting 
data about borrowers (Ping, 2003; CBRC, 2005). In this transition context, for Chinese 
banks, it is important that boards monitor with particular care larger exposures, and 
control lending activities and general risk exposure more frequently, in order to avoid 
crisis, and it is also essential a clear division of responsibilities among banking bodies 
regarding risk management. 
Chinese banks also have to strengthen credit controls, in order to improve their 
governance, and appoint a Chief Credit Officer (CCO), because one of the major risks 
that banks are facing is credit risk, where a strong credit management function needs to 
be independent from the business operating units. As regards supervision, in addition to 
improving cooperation between different supervisory bodies and promoting a clearer 
division of responsibilities, all banks need to have an independent internal audit function, 
that it must be independent of operations of the bank so that it can act as a ‘check and 
balance’ against weaknesses or breaches of procedures within the organisation. Another 
fundamental step in promoting good governance is the public listing, where admission to 
the listing is a signal that the bank meets the listing standards at the time of the IPO, and 
subsequently through market monitoring after the bank is listed. Also, through the listing 
banks should favour the entrance of strategic investors, including foreign investors, in 
order to benefit not only from their capital injections, but also from their technical 
assistance in different areas and their position on the boards, in order to push for 
governance reforms. Moreover, it is important to promote cooperation among financial 
institutions in China for better governance, in order to combine resources and gain 
synergies to compete against foreign players. Also, the convergence with international 
standards for accounting, audit and transparency can improve the level of corporate 
governance. In conclusion, substantial progress has been made in banking reforms to 
improve governance, but considerable works remains to be done, in order to increase the 
efficiency of banking intermediation. 
 
 
5 Index of economic freedom – the overall score: empirical evidence in a 
comparative perspective 
 
Taking into account the years since 1995 to 2015, we highlighted different trends of 
governance evolution in the various areas. If we look at the world average score of the 
 
 
index, we may assert that world economy looks like to be ‘moderately free’. The score 
for 2015 is 63.4 that represent a 7.03% overall improvement since the 1995, with 
significant different among regional areas: ranging from a minimum value of –2.37% 
registered for Latin America and a maximum value of +23.7% for transition countries. 
Regarding the general score about economic freedom in the first decade we notice a 
significant improvement in Western Europe (+7.9%), North America (+6.57%), 
Transition economies (around +14%), Sub-Saharan Africa (+6.71%) and in the 
Caribbean (around +14%), meanwhile the Middle East and North Africa region registers 
a significant decrease (–4.27%). Between 2005 and 2015, the overall index of economic 
freedom remains stable in Western Europe and North America, while the scores of some 
regional area improved (i.e., transition economies, Asia and Pacific and. Middle East and 
North Africa), and for others worsened (i.e., Latin America and Caribbean). During this 
last decade, economic and financial turmoil looks like to have realised different impacts 
in regional areas. North America and Western Europe continue to be the world’s most  
economically free regions, but transition economies, Asia and Pacific and Middle East 
and North Africa show some improvements. Despite meaningful improvements, the 
number of people living without economic freedom remains extremely high (about 65% 
of the world’s population) and are concentrated in two countries: China and India. In 
these two countries, advancements toward a higher degree of economic freedom are still 
limited. Some structural reforms in a few key sectors have sometimes driven the growth, 
but the government failures in the institutionalisation of an open environment to promote 
broad-based and improvements for freedom are still strong. 
The average score for countries belonging to the sample shows a slight increasing 
over the 20 years. This evidence may be associated with increasing values of the indexes 
of ‘fiscal freedom’, ‘monetary freedom’ and ‘trade freedom’. 
Western Europe region includes 19 countries: two ‘free’ economy (Ireland and 
Switzerland) and some of the freest countries in Europe. The average overall scores 
increases of 8% during the two decades. Altogether, however, the region still struggles 
with some policy barriers to dynamic economic expansion, higher tax burdens, costly 
labour regulations and increasing difficulties in public finance management. 
North America region shows two ‘mostly free’ economies (Canada and the USA). 
The average overall score for the whole period of analysis registers an increase, mainly 
driven by market openness indicators. Free Trade Agreement remains the key indicator of 
massive trade and investment flows (14% and 25%). 
Coming to Asia-Pacific area, during 2015 Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan 
significantly contributed to the improvement of the overall score. Nevertheless, Asia-
Pacific area, whose countries are mainly ranked as ‘mostly unfree’, juxtaposed four of the 
freest economies in the world (Hong Kong, Singapore, New Zealand and Australia) and 
the most repressed (Burma and North Korea, i.e.). In this context, India and China are 
ranked at the lowest scores in the ranking during the time of observation registering 
during the 2015 the 128th and 130th position, respectively, in the world. Despite these 
divergences, the region looks like to show economic resilience and dynamism. The high 
level of trade freedom (+43.8% during the period of analysis) point out that economies of 
this area have been capitalising on the freer flow of good and services, amplifying 
economic development and facilitating the development of trade agreements. Among the 
regions, average level of the index differs widely (see 
 
 
Appendix 1). The diversity of the world’s people and culture implied different paths to 
economic development and prosperity. 
 




Notes: *A decrease of the index of economic freedom measures a worsening of economic 
freedom conditions and the other way around. 
**Countries and areas are ranked as follows: Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK. 
North America: Canada, the USA. Asia and Pacific: Australia, Bangladesh, 
Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, China (People’s Republic of), Fiji, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea Democratic Republic of (North Korea), Laos, 
Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines (The), Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam). 
Source: Heritage Foundation website; our elaboration 
 
 
6 Chinese governance indexes vs. Western Europe and North American 
countries 
 
If we take into analysis more specifically Asia-Pacific countries, this index on average 
shows a light increase since 1995, although the index related to China remained 
substantially unchanged with slight decline in the overall score, quite close to the lower 
boundary of the ‘mostly unfree’ category. 
In relation with the general score, China moved from 52.7 in 1995 to 56.4 in 2000, 
successively dropping down to the same value registered during the first years of 
analysis. This poor performance about economic freedom is however consistent with an 





International Monetary Fund report that since 2007 gross domestic product increased 
yearly of roughly 10%. Moreover China emerges as the world’s third largest trading 
nation in 2005, (World Bank, 2005, 2006) becoming the second in 2009 and finally 
surpassing the USA as world’s largest trading nation in 2013. 
 
Figure 2 Index of economic freedom – overall score: Asia and Pacific vs. China (see online 
version for colours) 
 
Source: Heritage Foundation website, our elaboration 
China’s index of economic freedom ranked respectively 130th in 2015 and 129th in 2014 
and it is lower than the global and regional averages. If we look at the global trend of the 
whole period of time, it reveals a complex framework: after a consistent increase during 
the first years, since 2000 the economic freedom in China has undergone a relevant 
decrease, probably connected with the emphasis of the five year economic plan. 
Moreover, we remark neglectible improvements for some of the ingredients on the one 
hand, and decline for some others on the other hand. These evidences are linked with the 
specific role in China of the Communist party which holds influence both on the judicial 
system and economic activities, triggering a potential corruptive context (Prasad, 2005; 
World Bank, 2006). 
In relation to market openness indicators, trade freedom has slightly improved during 
the whole period of time, while scores for investment freedom, financial freedom, 
property rights, and the control of government spending have all suffered double-digit 
declines. Although the boost in trade freedom has undoubtedly helped to support China’s 
overall growth rates, the deterioration in other categories indicates that economic reforms 
may be desirable in order to frame a more balanced and sustainable perspective for 





During the first years of analysis, it may observe that trade is dominated by intra- 
industry trade in manufactured goods. Despite the evidence of a growth trend, data of the 
first decade underline the persistent impression that significant barriers still exist to the 
movement of factors of production, and to trade in services and intermediate goods 
(Naughton, 2000). Afterwards, the significant increase of trade freedom, connected with 
the Chinese joining to World Trade Organization in 2006, has been supported by the 
decrease in tariff trade, counterbalanced by the introduction of export taxes, subsidies to 
state-owned enterprises, anti-dumping barriers and tariffs (International Monetary Fund, 
2005). 
In relation to the indexes of investment freedom and financial freedom, the decrease 
of these two latter may be affected by government’s control on foreign investment, the 
conditions of access to credit and the strictly connected lack of transparency. The 
discipline of market principles that could enhance efficiency and long-term 
competitiveness has become sporadic and it is unequally distributed throughout the 
country. These evidences are connected with the absence of political willingness to 
undertake more fundamental restructuring of the domestic economy, probably because 
the high rate of growth experienced over the past years by China has anesthetised the 
quest for governance improvement. On the other hand, we have to recall that the main 
focus of the tenth five year economic plan (2001 to 2005) was mainly devoted to a ‘going 
out strategy’ connected with a significant flows of Chinese direct investment abroad 
(Prasad and Wei, 2005). 
If we take into analysis more specifically the banking score of the ‘financial freedom’ 
index dropped from 50 in 1999 to 30 in 2015. China’s banking system remains almost 
entirely state-owned (four state-owned banks hold over 50% of total banking assets), 
either directly or through state-owned companies. However, the restructuring of the real 
and financial sectors and the liberalisation of the financial system have proceeded 
relatively slowly notwithstanding the reform efforts, hypothetically because of the 
combined nature of second best of the governance indexes and of the exceptional rate of 
growth of Chinese economy over the analysed period (Tang, 2004; Taylor, 2006). 
North America and Western Europe move together for all the three scores, better than 
Asia and Pacific area and even more than China, registering an improving trend. 
Observing Figure 3, we highlight that, with the exception of trade freedom index, China 
register negative slope during the two decades, according to Asian and Pacific countries 
but with a more accentuated trend. Considering Asia and Pacific region, we found 
Hong Kong as one of the most open economies in the world for international and trade 
investment, together with its financial sector who remains highly competitive and well 
capitalised. On the contrary, we register India, Indonesia, Japan and the Philippine as 
countries characterised by various non-tariff-barriers that impede the free flow of good 
and services and distort trade, together with capped foreign investment. 
Western Europe trade agreement is currently being negotiated with countries that 
include the USA and Japan. In Germany, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, the 
financial sector appears competitive and stable, offering a full range of services, while in 
countries like Italy, France and Spain the financial system’s overall stability has been 
undermined and remain fragile. 
 
 
Figure 3   Market openness indicators (1995–2015), (a) trade freedom (b) investment freedom 












Figure 4 Government size (1995–2015), (a) fiscal freedom (b) government spending (see online 





Source: Heritage Foundation website, our elaboration 
Considering government spending as economic governance variable regarding 
government’s intervention in Chinese economy, during 1995, the country was 
characterised by a very high level of state intervention (93.70), through both consumption 
of scarce resources and involvement in business activities that may be eventually carried 
out more efficiently in the private sector. The Chinese indexes show on average a better 
trend in comparison with Western Europe (for both indexes) and with North American 
countries (for government spending index only). 
During 2006, the value decreased to 86 marginally increasing till 2008 and then 





government expenditures that account for 24.8% of the domestic output (23% in 2012), 
public debt equals to 22% of GDP (33.8% in 2012) and the tax burden equal to 19.4% of 
GDP (17.5% in 2012). 
 
Figure 5   Regulatory efficiency (1995–2015), (a) business freedom (b) labour freedom 












Figure 5   Regulatory efficiency (1995–2015), (a) business freedom (b) labour freedom 
(c) monetary freedom (continued) (see online version for colours) 
 
(c) 
Source: Heritage Foundation website, our elaboration 
Some comparative evidences of these   indexes   related   to   other   European   or 
North American countries may contribute to improve the comprehension of the Chinese 
peculiarities (see Appendix 1). To whom it concerns European countries, the more recent 
overall tax burden goes from 27.1% of GDP for Switzerland to 45% of GDP for France 
(36.7% Germany; 32.6% Spain; 42.6% Italy; 43.8% Belgium, among the others), 
together with a government expenditure that account in range between the 33.5% of total 
domestic output for Switzerland and the 57.5% for France (the other main countries are 
around 50%). The public debt value gains critical condition in European countries: except 
for Sweden and Luxembourg (one-third and 25% of the total domestic output) in all the 
other countries the public debt levels are alarming, being in the 4th quartile of the 
distribution and even more (i.e., Italy exceed 130% of the GDP). North American 
countries show a different situation: the USA registers an overall tax burden equals to 
25.4% of GDP and government spending about 39% of the total domestic products, while 
Canada shows tax burden equal to 30.6% and government spending amount to 40.7% of 
GDP. 
If we take into consideration China’s legal and regulatory system, business freedom 
score remains very low: a level of 55 is registered during all the first decade of 
observation, suffering a consistent decline in 2006. Notwithstanding, a smooth recovery 
since 2006, the final score in 2015 is still below the level in 1995. A similar trend may be 
detected observing labour freedom, experiencing a lower point in 2010 and a recovery in 
the following years, being again the final point of our historical series still below the 
starting point in 2005. Some of these improvements featuring the final years of our 
historical series may be connected with the launch of the 12th five year economic plan 
(2011 to 2015) addressed to organise a more market oriented institutional environments, 





registers a clear improvement over the years till 2006 and experiencing again a 
significant decline since then till the end of the period. 
 
Figure 6 Rule of law (1995–2015), (a) property right (b) freedom from corruption (see online 




Source: Heritage Foundation website, our elaboration 
The Asia and Pacific regions register more stable indexes although characterised by a 
suffering condition. Except for Hong Kong and Singapore, where the overall 
entrepreneurial environment remains one of the world’s most transparent and efficient, 
the labour market is vibrant and the labour force participation rate has gradually 
increased since 2010, in the other countries organising new investment and production 
remains burdensome, full of regulatory rigidities and costly, and labour market is 





European countries show, on average, better indexes to whom it concerns business 
freedom and monetary freedom (Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, Sweden and 
Switzerland better than the others), while we underline problems in the labour market 
(i.e., Italy, Portugal among the others), which appears fragile, stagnant and inflexible. 
These evidences could be view in Figure 5(b) that highlights the better position of labour 
freedom index for North American countries. The evidence are mainly driven by Canada 
that, with its highly competitive regulatory frameworks (truth for US also) promotes 
business formation and operation. Moreover, flexible labour regulations enhance 
employment and productivity growth. 
Rule of law may be disentangled in two different indexes: property rights and 
freedom from corruption. The first registers a stable trend till 2006 and successively 
worsened significantly. The low level of the score in property rights may be explained 
because of the weakness of the judicial system, yet highly vulnerable to the multifaceted 
aspects of political influence and connections, featuring Chinese economy. The common 
and constant presence of infringements on copyrights, patents, and trademarks is a 
common feature for China, jointly with the absence of protection’s measures for 
intellectual properties. Conversely, freedom from corruption index registers a slight 
increase overall the whole period and a more pronounced one since 2006, because of the 
recent commitments of the authorities to fight corruption since the Chinese joining to 
World Trade Organization, which was carefully planned in the years of the 11th five year 
economic plan (2006 to 2010). The issue of corruption is associated with the specific role 
of the Chinese state which juxtaposes the role of owner and regulator. This intertwined 
aspects may be considered as the effective Achilles’s heel of Chinese economy. 
The American people’s trust in their government is the lowest it has been in the past 
ten years, according to the three Gallup polls released in 2015, with 75% of respondents 
saying they believe corruption is widespread in the government and in government 
regulation of business. Although property rights are guaranteed and the judiciary 
functions independently and predictably, protection of those rights in practice has been 
uneven. Canada has a reputation for clean government instead, a judicial system with an 
impeccable record of independence and transparency, and vigorous prosecution of 
corruption cases. Although 89% of Canada’s land area is owned by the state, the 11% 
that is privately owned property is well protected. Moreover, enforcement of contracts is 
very secure. 
The evidences related to ‘freedom from corruption’ index for Western European 
countries should be divided into different and opposite groups: on the one hand we point 
out countries like Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden and Switzerland where corruption is 
relative rare or low and government had increased its prevention and prosecution effect 
against corruption. Moreover, the judiciary is independent, and social norms and customs 
strongly support the rule of law. On the other hand, we highlight France, Spain and 
Portugal where, although the government actively promotes transparency, accountability 
and civic participation, questionable political party influence and party donation still 
exist, together with lack of preventive measure for corruption in party funding and public 
procurement. Furthermore, Italy showed a series of high-level, politically destabilising 
corruption scandals, culminated in a December 2014 investigation of numerous Rome 
municipal officials implicated in a public contracts corruption case, known as ‘Mafia 
Capitale’ and the legal system is vulnerable to political interference. To whom it concerns 
property right index, we register a common positive condition: with the exception of 
 
 
Greece, all the Western European countries well protect property right and the contracts 
are secure. 
In order to give a more widespread comprehension of Chinese governance, we 
provide additional and complementary global governance indicators elaborated by the 
Wall Street Journal and World Bank. Because of the different period of availability of 
these data (1996 to 2014), we focus specifically our attention mainly on four not 
otherwise available indicators, i.e.: 
a voice and accountability 
b political stability and absence of violence 
c government effectiveness 
d regulatory quality. 
The above mentioned indexes showed a slight, but continue worsening since 1996 till 
2014, highlighting a decrease in governance quality, despite the magnitude of the rate of 
economic growth. More specifically, government effectiveness and regulatory quality 
register a decrease over the last five years, meanwhile the decrease of the political 
stability and absence of violence index dates back to 2000. In particular, over the past 
two decades, China’s economic reforms have brought remarkable growth, thanks also to 
the progressive openness of the economy to outside since 1978. As we have just 
remarked such extraordinary economic performance does not fit with a clear 
improvements of governance indexes. On the contrary, all these indexes, quite poor in 
1995 indeed, register a substantial decrease over the two decades. Political stability and 
absence of violence decreases from –0.2 in 1996 to –0.5 in 2014, as it is shown in 
Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7   Worldwide governance indicators (1996–2014) (see online version for colours) 
 






From this point of view, whenever the objective of the Chinese Government were the 
pursue of a harmonious society which distributes to the citizens the remarkable benefits 
of the extraordinary industrial development of the last two decades, this target was not 
achieved. We provide further evidence of this phenomenon observing the voice and 
accountability variable. 
The score of this index, being negative in 1996 registers a further decrease from –1.3 
to –1.5 in 2014 because of the protests of the population for their living conditions and 
the increasing inequality always more enveloping the country. Notwithstanding, these 
poor performances of these indexes, not uncommon in rapidly developing countries 
(Arnone et al., 2006), the index of government effectiveness realised a significant 
increase improving from –0.25 in 1996 to a maximum of 0.15 in 2008, diminishing later 
on to roughly 0 in 2012 and up to 0.3 in 2014, as highlighted in Figure 7. Chinese 
Government policies have been partially successful in increasing domestic demand and 
reducing the development gap among different country’s regions, improving agricultural 
productivity and implementing some sort of more system for health and welfare. Over 
time, these achievements have contributed to reduce Chinese poverty rate, with a positive 
impact on the world poverty reduction (Tseng and Cowen, 2005). Regulatory quality 
indicator shows overall a negative score, worsening however from –0.1 in 1996 to –0.5 in 
2002, improving again to –0.1 in 2008 and then worsening again till –0.3 in 2014. 
Meanwhile, the substantial increase between 2002 and 2006 may be ascribed to the 
requirements for joining the World Trade Organization, the successive diminution finds 
probably its roots in the low level of coordination among different Chinese authorities 
and the unclear division of their responsibilities and because inefficient and incomplete 





After different financial scandals, financial crisis and the loss of investors’ confidence in 
the market, the interest in corporate governance has grown considerably in the last 
decades. In China, corporate governance has been seen as an important element to 
accommodate the needs of changing business environment, given the transition to a 
market economy. The government is aware that if China wishes to attract more investors 
it will need to have a corporate governance system that protects minority rights, 
guarantees transparency and timely information, and favours confidence in corporate 
activities. 
Despite the considerable Chinese economic growth, the overall governance overview 
remains quite poor, but it not likely to have negatively affected the remarkable economic 
performance over the last two decades. According to the above mentioned existing 
literature, we may assert that governance variables are likely to have a second order 
effect in stimulating and supporting economic growth, in comparison to other 
macroeconomic variables, but they have not prevented a rapid economic growth. 
However, a more detailed analysis of the whole period shows that around 2006, the 
date of the Chinese joining to the World Trade Organization and the launch of the 
11th five years economic plan, governance indexes registered a marginal increase. 
Chinese participation to the WTO contributed to the fostering of Chinese manufacturing 




Over the years, this has turned China into a global economic force. The banking 
sector has been changed by reforms, because it represents a very important source of 
external financing for firms that most of the times do not have direct access to financial 
markets. Banks continue to dominate China’s financial sector, where the four SOCBs are 
the driven force, but with problems of low transparency, lack of protection for investors, 
government interference and high level of NPLs. 
Because of this external pressure, Chinese Government is likely to have attributed 
more importance to governance indexes and, in a more limited way, to corporate 
governance indicators as well. Meanwhile, governance indexes may have not therefore 
been the key ingredients of the past outstanding Chinese economic performance; it is 
likely that they may represent key factors in the future for attracting foreign capital 
inflows and creating condition for sustainability of Chinese economic growth. More 
specifically, the past poor performance of many governance indexes in China is strictly 
correlated with the relevant role played by the state in economy and in economic 
development. Moreover, marginal increase or decrease of such indexes may be explained 
by the specific focuses of five years economic plans which occurred in sequence during 
the mentioned period of time. 
While on one hand an improvement of governance indexes in China is likely to be a 
mandatory path in order to support and improve future economic performances, these are 
strictly linked with the political willingness of a withdrawal of Chinese state from direct 
intervention in the economy and in assuming a regulatory role, according to the market 
oriented economy standard. In particular, Chinese Government should create a more 
market supportive legal and regulatory framework. 
For China and other Asian emerging economies where banks generally play a more 
important role than in other financially-advanced economies, it is essential to have sound 
financial institutions and promote their modernisation in order to favour long-term 
growth and the transition to a market economy. The modernisation process must include 
different aspects, such as the regulatory system, corporate governance, ownership and 
property rights, financial infrastructure, accounting standards, payment and credit 
systems, risk management, and law enforcement: they are essential steps to enhance 
efficiency and governance. Important improvements need to be made in modernising 
internal systems for credit assessment, loan monitoring and risk management, introducing 
also new loans classification system and deposit insurance scheme, in order to favour a 
more accurate risk pricing and increase the efficiency of the system. The success of 
banks’ restructuring and reforms is therefore an essential and necessary step for further 
financial reforms, which in turn would strengthen financial soundness and 
macroeconomic stability, and foster sustainable economic growth. 
An agenda of future research may be devoted in declining these outcomes at 
corporate levels and eventually in other fast emerging economies, in order to verify to 
which extent governance indexes and corporate governance affect industrial and 
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Market openness indicators 
Regional area Trade freedom •% Investment freedom •% Financial freedom •% 
 1995 2005 2015 1995–2005 2005–2015 1995 2005 2015 1995–2005 2005–2015 1995 2005 2015 1995–2005 2005–2015 
Western Europe 76.7 80.2 87.7 4.54% 9.28% 66.4 74.2 83.2 11.82% 12.06% 60.9 74.2 70.0 21.84% -5.67% 
North America 76.8 81.3 87.7 5.86% 7.87% 60.0 60.0 75.0 0.00% 25.00% 70.0 80.0 75.0 14.29% -6.25% 
Asia and Pacific 50.3 64.5 72.3 28.33% 12.08% 55.3 45.0 47.8 –18.57% 6.22% 53.2 42.1 49.2 –20.83% 16.91% 
Government size                
Regional area Fiscal freedom •% Government spending •% 
 1995 2005 2015 1995–2005 2005–2015 1995 2005 2015 1995–2005 2005–2015 
Western Europe 52.2 54.9 57.5 5.07% 4.67% 28.7 32.5 27.2 13.3% –16.3% 
North America 64.5 71.9 73.1 11.40% 1.67% 36.3 55.4 50.1 52.6% –9.7% 
Asia and Pacific 62.0 73.5 76.5 18.59% 4.11% 74.9 76.8 73.9 2.6% –3.8% 
Regulatory efficiency 
 
Regional area Business freedom •% Labour freedom •% Monetary freedom •% 
 1995 2005 2015 1995–2005 2005–2015 1995 2005 2015 1995–2005 2005–2015 1995 2005 2015 1995–2005 2005–2015 
Western Europe 78.2 76.3 82.9 –2.39% 8.67% - 63.2 60.0 - –5.11% 79.17 85.28 81.19 7.72% –4.80% 
North America 85.0 85.0 88.9 0.00% 4.59% - 88.8 87.3 - –1.69% 84.85 85.20 77.25 0.41% –9.33% 
Asia and Pacific 66.1 63.1 65.9 –4.43% 4.46% - 62.8 64.9 - 3.33% 68.58 76.28 72.71 11.22% –4.67% 
Rule of law                
Regional area Property right •% Freedom from •% 
corruption 
 1995 2005 2015 1995–2005 2005–2015 1995 2005 2015 1995–2005 2005–2015 
Western Europe 75.5 83.7 81.6 10.91% –2.52% 68.2 77.8 72.7 14.09% –6.50% 
North America 90.0 90.0 85.0 0.00% –5.56% 90.0 81.0 77.0 –10.00% –4.94% 
Asia and Pacific 61.6 45.8 43.2 –25.57% –5.75% 44.7 40.1 42.7 –10.31% 6.30% 































































































Table 2 Fiscal freedom – by country (1995–2015) 
 
Fiscal freedom 1995 2000 2006 2010 2015 
China 70.6 70.4 70 70.2 69.7 
Western Europe      
Austria 46.3 44.2 50.2 51.2 50.1 
Belgium n/a 33.1 42.8 42.2 43.6 
Denmark n/a 30.5 35.5 35.9 39.6 
Finland n/a 37.2 61.9 65.4 66.4 
France 60.8 35.1 46.6 51.9 47.5 
Germany 33.2 38.6 60.8 58.3 60.8 
Greece 62.5 52.2 61 65.9 64.2 
Iceland n/a 64.8 73.7 75.4 72 
Ireland 49.1 60.6 72 71.1 73.6 
Italy 43.6 45.6 52 55.2 54.2 
Luxembourg n/a 51.3 65.7 65.9 62.3 
Malta 68.2 64.1 62.2 62.5 63.1 
Norway n/a 57.3 50.8 50.5 52.1 
Portugal 60.5 60.4 64 61 61.1 
Spain 45.2 45.8 55.3 58.1 53.1 
Sweden 44 34.1 33.2 36.7 43 
Switzerland n/a 80.7 73.4 68.2 70.3 
The Netherlands n/a 36.9 48 52 51.8 
UK 61.3 62.5 62.3 61.8 62.9 
North America      
Canada 64.2 40 75.3 76.7 79.9 
USA 64.8 63.8 68.9 67.5 66.2 
Source: Heritage Foundation website, our elaboration 
 
 
Table 3 Government spending – by country (1995–2015) 
 
Government spending 1995 2000 2006 2010 2015 
China 93.7 90.3 86 88.1 81.5 
Western Europe      
Austria 9.6 25 23.2 28.8 19.8 
Belgium n/a 18.9 26.8 30 10.2 
Denmark n/a 0 9.3 22 1.8 
Finland n/a 0 24.4 32.9 3.6 
France 15.7 12.5 11.2 17.9 2.5 
Germany 30.6 28 31.7 41.4 40.1 
Greece 55.3 54.4 53.9 41.9 0 
Iceland n/a 58.9 32 45.8 32.6 
Ireland 38.7 63.3 64.7 61.8 45.6 
Italy 3.6 22 29.1 31.2 23.2 
Luxembourg n/a 67.3 36.8 58.5 42.2 
Malta 51.8 36.5 35.4 45.6 44.4 
Norway n/a 41.9 34.9 49.8 43.8 
Portugal 36 41.9 29.7 37.1 28.8 
Spain 36.8 47.1 50.5 54.8 39.8 
Sweden 0 0 2.2 17.3 19.2 
Switzerland n/a 28 61.1 68.9 65.1 
The Netherlands n/a 28 29.1 38.4 23.8 
UK 37.3 49.6 43.5 41.9 30.3 
North America      
Canada 14.8 41.9 53.4 54.1 48.3 
USA 57.8 69.3 61.1 58 51.8 





Description of the indices of economic freedom and the global governance 
indicators 
A Description of the indices of economic freedom 
These indicators, which are published every year, are formulated by The Heritage 
Foundation (2016), a research and educational institute, founded in 1973, whose mission 
is to formulate and promote public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, 
individual freedom and a strong national defence. It is a joint publication of The Heritage 
Foundation and The Wall Street Journal and it has tracked the progress of economic 
freedom around the globe, evolving into a data-driven practical policy guidebook that 
covers many countries encompassing 99% of the world’s population. The index of 
economic freedom documents the positive relationship between economic freedom and a 
variety of positive social and economic goals. The ideals of economic freedom are 
strongly associated with healthier societies, cleaner environments, greater per capita 
wealth, human development, democracy, and poverty elimination. Heritage Foundation 
defines the ‘economic freedom’ as “the absence of government coercion or constraint on 
the production, distribution or consumption of goods and services beyond the extent 
necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself. That is people are free to 
work, produce, consume and invest in the ways they feel are most productive”. 
This index measures the degree of economic freedom in 186 countries around the 
world with a large number of variables that can influence economic development and are 
divided in ten qualitative and qualitative categories of freedom – from property rights to 
entrepreneurship: 
1 property rights 
2 freedom from corruption 
3 fiscal freedom 
4 government spending 
5 business freedom 
6 labour freedom 
7 monetary freedom 
8 trade freedom 
9 investment freedom 
10 financial freedom. 
Each of the ten economic freedoms within these categories is scored on a scale of 0 
(worst) to 100 (best). A country’s overall score is derived by simple averaging these ten 
economic freedoms, with equal weight being given to each12. 
The ten economic freedoms are grouped into four broad categories: 
a rule of law (property rights, and freedom from corruption) 
b limited government (fiscal freedom, and government spending) 
 
 
c regulatory efficiency (business freedom, labour freedom, and monetary freedom) 
d open markets (trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial freedom). 
The Index can assume values from 0 to 100, where, in general, high scores are more 
desirable, In particular, there are five categories of the level of economic freedom: 
1 free 80–100 
2 mostly free 70–79.9 
3 moderately free 60–69.9 
4 mostly un-free 50–59.9 
5 repressed 40–49.9. 
The index ‘property rights’ measures the will of the government to guarantee the private 
property and protect it by the expropriation. The index ‘freedom from corruption’ relies 
on the integrity in the economic system and the freedom from distortion by which 
individuals or special-interest groups are able to gain at the expense of the whole. This 
component is derived primarily from Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) for 2011, which measures the level of corruption in 
183 countries on a scale from 0 (very corrupted government) to 10 (very little 
corruption), converted on a scale of 0 to 100 by multiplying the CPI score by 10 (i.e., if a 
country’s raw CPI data score is 5.9, its overall freedom of corruption score is 59). A 
score of 0 indicated very high level of perceived corruption, while a score of 
100 indicates a very little perceived corruption. 
The index fiscal freedom measures the extent to which government permits 
individuals and business to keep and manage their income and wealth for their own 
benefit and use. It includes the marginal tax rates and the year-to-year change in the level 
of government expenditure regulations often limit the creation of new business. In the 
index of economic freedom, the burden of these taxes is captured by measuring the 
overall tax burden from all forms of taxation as a percentage of total GDP. 
Government spending considers zero government spending as the benchmark, and 
underdeveloped countries with little government capacity may receive artificially high 
scores as a result. However, such governments, which can provide few if any public 
goods, are likely to receive lower scores on some of the other components of economic 
freedom (such as property rights, financial freedom, and investment freedom) that reflect 
government effectiveness. 
Business freedom is an overall indicator of the efficiency of government regulation of 
business. It is about an individual’s right to establish and run an enterprise without undue 
interference from the state. The score is based on ten factors, all equally weighted, using 
data from the World Bank’s Doing Business study [starting a business: procedures 
(number); time (days); cost (percentage of income per capita); minimum capital 
(percentage of income per capita); obtaining a license: procedures (number); time (days); 
cost (percentage of income per capita); closing a business: time (years); cost (percentage 
of estate); recovery rate (cents on the dollar)]. 
The labour freedom component is a quantitative measure that considers various 
aspects of the legal and regulatory framework of a country’s labour market, including 
 
 
regulations concerning minimum wages, laws inhibiting layoffs, severance requirements, 
and measurable regulatory restraints on hiring and worked hours. 
The index monetary freedom combines a measure of price stability with an 
assessment of price controls. Both inflation and price controls distort market activity. Its 
score is a number between 0 and 100 and is based of two factors related to the weighted 
average inflation rate for the most recent three years and price controls. 
Trade freedom reflects an economy’s openness to the flow of goods and services 
from outside and the citizen’s ability to interact freely as buyer or seller in the 
international marketplace. 
Investment freedom measures the level of capital flows, foreign investment and 
analyses the investment climate in a country. This indicator is composed by different 
variables, that includes the country’s investment laws, the treatment of investors and 
firms, the restrictions on foreign ownership of business, the openness to foreign investors 
and the government restrictions on capital transactions. 
The financial freedom variable is a measure of banking efficiency as well as a 
measure of independence from government control and interference in the financial 
sector. 
 
B Description of the global governance indicators 
Global governance indicators are formulated annually by the World Bank and consist in 
an update set of worldwide governance indicators, which cover 215 countries. Beginning 
in the late ‘90s, the World Bank began to develop and analyse measures for six 
components of good governance: 
1 voice and accountability 
2 political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 
3 government effectiveness 
4 regulatory quality 
5 rule of law 
6 control of corruption. 
In order to give a more widespread comprehension of Chinese governance, we focus on 
four of these indices, not yet analysed: 
a voice and accountability 
b political stability and absence of violence 
c government effectiveness 
d regulatory quality. 
The four aggregate indicators are based on 31 underlying data sources reporting the 
perceptions of governance of a large number of survey respondents and expert 
assessments worldwide. Different scale of measure may be used for these indices. Here, 
we reported the values on an ‘estimate scale’, ranges from approximately –2.5 (weak) to 
2.5 (strong) governance performance. In particular, our analysis is based on the values 
referred to 1996 to 2013 periods. 
 
 
Moving to consider the single indicators, the first is ‘voice and accountability’: it 
measures political, civil and human rights. In particular, it reflects the possibility for the 
citizens to appoint and replace their representatives in elected house of representatives. 
The ‘political stability and absence of terrorism/violence’ indicator measures the 
likelihood of violent threats to governments, including terrorism. 
As regards the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public services 
delivery, the ‘government effectiveness’ indicator measures the ability of governments to 
formulate and enforce credible and coherent policies over time. This indicator includes 
different variables that regard the public services delivery, the bureaucracy and its 
independence from the political pressure, the competence of the public employees and so 
on. 
To measure the incidence of market-unfriendly policies, the ‘regulatory quality’ 
indicator makes a reference to the quality of the policies formulated and enforced by 
governments. This variable includes some under-indicators that could have a negative 
incidence on the quality of these policies, such as controls over prices, an inefficient 




1 Studying Chinese law challenges assumptions and expectations about institutional behaviour, 
European and North American perspectives often assume the centrality of institution in 
economic and political performance. The China record, however, suggests otherwise. 
2 Similar evidences may be assumed about the banking sector, largely owned by the state and 
featured by low capitalisation, solvency and NPLs. 
3 Established in the 1980s and called the ‘Big Four’ they are the dominant players in China’s 
banking sector. They are the following: Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank of China 
(BOC), China Construction Bank (CCB) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC). 
4 They were created in 1994 with state-directed lending role by the government. The policy 
banks are the following: Agricultural Development Bank of China, China Development Bank 
and Export-Import Bank of China. 
5 Some of these institutions have represented an important step for an initial liberalisation 
process of the Chinese financial system. Commercial banks can be divided into two main 
groups: Joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and City commercial banks (CCBs). 
6 Established in the 1980s the main objectives was to diversify the financial system and provide 
funds through the financing of projects in areas where resources were limited. 
7 Their role is still limited in China financial system. In particular, since the end of 2006, just 
before the break up of the financial crisis, banking sector has been completely opened to 
foreign competition, eliminating geographic, business and currency limitation. This aspect 
represents an essential step in order to favour competition and the entrance of national and 
international strategic investors, and to diversify ownership structure in state-owned banks. 
8 Since their establishment in the 1980s their main objectives have included support for private 
sector development and financing outside the credit quotas imposed to commercial banks. 
They were established both by Chinese banks to support a growing market demand for loans 
on behalf of the rapid economic growth and local governments in raising funds directly, in 
order to finance local priority projects and obtain higher returns on their investment than 
through bank deposits. 
9 The ownership of these institutions is more frequently in the hands of the state, where the 
focus is on market share. However, in the last few years, new insurance companies are joint-
stock companies. Their main objective is focused on economic returns. Since the Chinese 
 
 
achievements of a full WTO membership, this sector has become more interesting for foreign 
investors. 
10 At the beginning of their establishment in 1999, they were seen as independent companies that 
received NPLs from SOCBs in order to manage and recover them by using several asset 
recovery methods. The process was aimed at restructuring these capital loans or transform 
them into equity. In particular the AMCs can borrow from financial institutions in order to 
achieve their objectives. 
11 The development of the stock exchanges has been favoured with the establishment of these 
institutions since the 1990s. Actually, their ownership is diversifying via the participation of 
the private sector. The leasing companies account for 1% of the banking sector’s total assets. 
12 The index of economic freedom considers every component equally important in achieving the 
positive benefits of economic freedom. Each freedom is weighted equally in determining 
country scores. Countries considering economic reforms may find significant opportunities for 
improving economic performance in those factors in which they score the lowest. These 
factors may indicate significant binding constraints on economic growth and prosperity. 
